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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH

SHEILA WHERRITT
GRAZIANO,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
No. 8640

-vs.CHARLES BENITO GRAZIANO,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Appellant
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant intermarried at Elko, N evada, on March 6, 1955. (R. 33, 43 and 44; Exh. 1) A
daughter, Gina Graziano, was born the issue of said marriage at Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 20, 1955. (R 36)
There is no testimony as to the ages of plaintiff and defendant but your author believes that it will be agreed
that plaintiff is twenty-five years of age and that defendant is twenty-four years of age at the time of the trial.
At the time of and before said marriage plaintiff and
1
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defendant were employed at Alta, Utah, the plaintiff at
Rustler's Lodge and the defendant with ski school instruction and acting in a motion picture being produced
there· and that both resided at Rustler's Lodge at Alta.
'
(R. 36) After said marriage and on or about April 1,
1955, while defendant was still engaged in the motion
picture work, defendant began employment as a chef and
manager at Finn's Restaurant in Salt Lake City, Utah,
and resided at the Country Club 1Iotor Lodge. (R 36)
Plaintiff began telling defendant that plaintiff's mother
repeatedly told plaintiff that defendant's occupation as a
chef was degrading. (R. 79, 80, 105 and 106) Plaintiff
and defendant on or about 11ay 1, 1955, moved to the
Mcl{innon home on Federal Way in Salt Lake City to
occupy that home while the owners were away and on
or about June 1, 1955, plaintiff and defendant moved into
the apartment of a duplex at 2765 Wilshire Drive in Salt
Lake City and resided there until about November 30,
1955. (R. 102) Defendant's employment at Finn's Restaurant was opportuned because ~Ir. Finn Gurholt, the
owner and regular chef and manager was incapacitated
clue to an accident and it was understood between defendant and :Mr. Gurholt that upon ~Ir. Gurholt's recovery and return the employment of the defendant would
be unneeded. Therefore, on or about October 1, 1955, the
defendant's employment at Finn's Restaurant terminated. ( R. 96, and 97) Soon thereafter defendant became employed at the Alta Club in Salt Lake City as a
buffet chef and at times serving at the bar. (R. 102) During defendant's employment at Alta Club plaintiff kept
telling defendant that plaintiff's mother insisted that deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendant 's employment was degrading to plaintiff and
plaintiff's family and that some of plaintiff's mother's
friends had mentioned to plaintiff's mother that they had
seen and met defendant while at his buffet and bar duties
at the Alta Club. (R. 78, 80, 105 and 106) The Alta Club
employment was of about two weeks' duration and until
about the 26th of October 1955. (R. 102) Defendant thereafter and about November 1, 1955, began work as a chef
at the tea-room which Mr. Finn Gurholt operated in Makoff's in downtown Salt Lake City. Defendant's employment at said tea-room ceased on or about the last week of
November 1955 because of a discontinuance of operation
and the entire tea-room staff was laid off. (R. 97 and 102)
During the residence of plaintiff and defendant at
2765 Wilshire Drive in Salt Lake City, defendant furnished their apartment and plaintiff's mother dictated
the placement of furniture and generally interfered with
plaintiff's and defendant's homemaking. (R. 80) Plaintiff did no cooking of meals and very little of house cleaning during their residence in Salt Lake City after their
marriage. (R. 82, and 112) After plaintiff's and defendant's child Gina was born at the hospital at Salt Lake City
plaintiff and the child were taken to plaintiff's mother's
home and remained there so long, to the embarrassment
of the defendant, that defendant finally found it necessary to insist that plaintiff and the child come and reside
at plaintiff's and defendant's home. (R. 106) The testimony of defendant, undenied by plaintiff, shows that
plaintiff indulged in the reading of pornographic literature provided by her mother, and defendant found it

3
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necessary to return such book to plaintiff's mother. (R.
116 and 117) Defendant's testimony, undenied and corroborated by plaintiff's testimony, shows that during the
years from 1948 to 1955 plaintiff had numerous illicit
sexual intercourse affairs with a number of men about
which plaintiff continually told defendant. (R. 67 to 71
inc. and 113 to 116 inc.) Plaintiff's mother had plaintiff
will all her assets to her mother shortly after the marriage. (R 73) Plaintiff eradicated the date on the marriage certificate. (R. 44) Plaintiff voluntarily testified
that the child Gina was conceived out of wedlock. (R. 44)
Plaintiff, while living in Aspen, Colorado, left the child
unattended. (R. 117) Plaintiff admits that she does not
believe in God or Christ and intended not to give the child
any Christian guidance and rearing. (R. 90, 91 and 118)
Defendant is a lifelong member of the Catholic religious
faith and a devout Christian. (R. 118 and 119)
Defendant on or about December 1, 1955, contacted
Charles Sail, who operates the Hotel Jerome at Aspen,
Colorado, and obtained employment as a chef at said
hotel. (R. 36 and 37) Plaintiff, defendant and their
ehild moved to Aspen, Colorado, about December 1, 1955,
and took residence there until about ~Iarch 1, 1956.
(R. 37) During their stay at Aspen plaintiff's mother
visited them there and on or about February 20th, 1956,
plaintiff and 1hPir child came to Salt Lake City to visit
pbintiff's mother and family. (R. 38 and 107) On or
about l\lnreh 1, 1956, defendant phoned plaintiff at Salt
Lake City from Aspen and related to her that he had quit
his job in Aspen and should they go to Connecticut and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plaintiff agreed to move and entrained with their child
to Glenwood Springs, Colorado, where defendant met
them and took them to Aspen, from whence they drove
to Connecticut in their automobile arriving at Bristol,
Connecticut, about March 6, 1956. (R. 38) At the time of
and immediately after their marriage plaintiff and plaintiff's mother and family expressed desires that plaintiff
and defendant move to Connecticut. (R. 72, 73, 90 and
110) Connecticut is defendant's home state, although
during the major portion of the seven years preceding the
marriage defendant had lived in Utah (R. 64) Defendant, plaintiff and child took residence at defendant's
mother's house in Bristol, Connecticut. (R. 39) The house
in Connecticut is a two-story structure with nine rooms
on the main floor, consisting of three bedrooms, two
kitchens, dining room, living room, bathroom and a sun
room; and a complete apartment on the second floor.
(R. 55 and 108) The defendant's brother and brother's
wife and daughter occupy the second floor apartment.
The first floor of the house is well furnished and very
modern in all respects. (R. 55) Plaintiff testified that
house was inadequate and she had no privacy but later
she testified "there was nothing wrong with the house."
(R. 55 line 29) Plaintiff testified that the people in the
house and neighborhood in Connecticut were ''illiterate.''
(R. 39) On cross-examination plaintiff admits she did
not know if they were illiterate and all she ended up with
was that defendant's mother could not read English.
(R. 56, 58 and 59)

5
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Defendant was employed soon after arrival in Connecticut by his brother in a credit and collection business
as a salesman or solicitor. (R. 39 and 40) About two
weeks after arriving in Connecticut defendant traded his
Ford automobile on a Porsche automobile for use in his
work. (R. 40) Defendant's employment withhis brother
ended after two weeks when defendant obtained employment with International Harvester Company Branch with
good opportunities. (R. 41) Plaintiff testified that she
was unhappy living around defendant's relations and the
Italian and Polish neighbors and that she asked defendant to find a place of their own but plaintiff agreed to wait
until the results of defendant's draft board status was
determined as he might be drafted and plaintiff and child
would then have another place provided. (R. 39, 40 and
41) Plaintiff testified that in ~\_pril1956-about a month
after their arrival in Connecticut-she asked defendant
to give her a divorce and defendant refused (R. 40, 41
and 91) Plaintiff also testified that she asked defendant
to let her go home and she was of the opinion that defendant didn't care if she left but he didn't want to let
the child go. (R. 41) During April1956 plaintiff's sister
\Vendy Yisited plaintiff and defendant at their home in
Connecticut and plaintiff made a three- or four-day visit
with her said sister in Boston, ~Iassachusetts. (R. 80 and
81) Defendant testified that plaintiff's sister \Yendy
phoned plaintiff before leaYing for Europe and plaintiff
told defendant her sister urged her to leaYe defendant and
to go home; but plaintiff says that she does not remember
this. (R. 65 and 133) About June 1956 plaintiff received
a letter or phone eall from her mother and defendant tes6
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tifies plaintiff thereafter told defendant her mother said
she would disown plaintiff if plaintiff didn't leave defendant. (R. 107 and 134) Defendant agreed with plaintiff in June 1956 to sell the Porsche automobile and
arrange for an apartment to move into and on or about
the 12th day of July 1956 defendant traded the Porsche
on a Studebaker car and was proceeding to arrange for
an apartment. (R. 92 and 93) On July 17, 1956 before
defendant left for his work in the morning he asked the
plaintiff to bring their automobile that evening and pick
him up at his place of work, which plaintiff agreed to do.
(R. 60) Plaintiff failed to come to defendant's place of
work to pick defendant up as arranged and when defendant arrived home he found a note from plaintiff stating:
"Dear Charlie : By the time you read this we will be in
Chicago. I'm sorry to have to run away like this, but
neither of us could stand a whole lifetime in our circumstances. I had to leave. Don't blame it on anybody but
you and me. Sheila.' (Exh. 3 and R. 52) On July 17,
1956, plaintiff took their child and baggage and went to
IIartford, Connecticut, before noon and stayed at a boarding house there until plane time-about 6 p.m.-and then
boarded a plane with their child and came to Salt Lake
City (R. 61) After July 17, 1956, defendant found a bank
book on a Bristol, Connecticut, bank with deposits to the
plaintiff. Plaintiff had secretly set up or had set up for
her the account of which she admits she received $200.00
from her step-father in April 1956 and several smaller
sums amounting to $60.00 deposited during the months of
May and June, which she states came from defendant's
earnings. (Exh. 4, R. 62 and 63) Plaintiff admits that deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendant knew nothing of the~e deposits and she kept them
secret from him. (R. 63 and 64) Plaintiff states th~t her
stepfather sent the money for her to leave defendant and
come home. (R. 63 and 64) Plaintiff is possessed of quite
some financial worth represented by stocks and bonds.
(R. 94 and 95)
In the evening of July 17, 1956, defendant phoned
plaintiff's mother's home in Salt Lake City and was informed that plaintiff's family did not know where plaintiff was. (R. 110 and 111) The morning of July 18, 1956,
defendant again phoned plaintiff's mother's home in Salt
Lake City and talked with plaintiff there. (R. 111) In the
conversation plaintiff informed defendant that their marriage was through and for defendant to stay in Connecticut and not come to Salt Lake City and if he did come
he would not be allowed to see their child (R. 111) On
July 26, 1956, plaintiff wrote defendant a letter in which
plaintiff admits defendant is not at fault but that plaintiff is at fault and that if defendant will stay in Connecticut and not come and contest a divorce plaintiff will
not ask for support money or alimony. The letter is as
follows:
'' ... I \Yas, still am, and always will be Yer-y
sorry for making a tragedy in ~'"our life. You are
n'rr good and don't deserYe it, but there "\Yas no
other fair wa~· to end the mess we got ourselves
iu.to. I know t hn t now yon are thii;king only of
Guw, but ~·on don't seem to realize that it would
be terribly bad for her ps~·rlwlog-icall~, to be shuttlt>d back and forth for the rest of her life....
8
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''I will start divorce proceedings as soon as
possible and give you rights of visitation, but if
you come out now, I'll refuse to let you see her ....
''I don't intend to ask for any alimony or support money, so I hope you won't have much trouble
paying off your debt ....
''It will take nine months for the divorce to
be final, so don't get married yet. . . . '' Exh. 2,
R. 51 and 52)
On or about October 1, 1956, defendant left his
employment in Connecticut and came to Salt Lake City
and through a mutual friend contacted the plaintiff on
the phone and plaintiff agreed to and did visit defendant at his place of abode a few days later. (R. 25 and
119) Thereafter, plaintiff allowed a visit to defendant
with his child on or about October 7, 1956. (R. 120) Defendant made attempts in this visit and others later to
effect a reconciliation with the plaintiff. (R. 121) On or
about the 17th day of October 1956 plaintiff brought to
defendant a complaint and a waiver of service and
answer and asked defendant to sign the waiver. (R. 46,
47 and 122) Defendant agreed to look them over. (R. 122)
At the meeting defendant asked for a few hours' visit
with their child on October 20, 1956, the child's first birthday, and plaintiff agreed to allow such visit. (R. 48 and
122) Defendant bought presents and made a cake for the
child's birthday. On October 20, 1956, plaintiff with their
child, came to defendant's residence and asked defendant
if he had signed the waiver. (R. 49, 123) Defendant said
no and called plaintiff's attention to the marriage date
set out in the complaint, namely January 30, 1955, as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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being incorrect. (R45, 47 and 48) The complaint also
asked for $1.00 alimony per month. (R. 79) Defendant
told plaintiff he would not sign the waiver and he tore
it up. (R. 50 and 123) Plaintiff received the presents
and cake for the child but told defendant if he would not
sign the waiver he could not visit with the child and
plaintiff and child left. (R. 50 and 123)
Defendant soon after arriving at Salt Lake City in
October 1956 obtained employment with Victor Adding
l\1:achine Company as a salesman in and about Salt Lake
City and was required to take a two-week training course
at Sacramento, California, from October 23, 1956, to November 6, 1956, at which time he returned to Salt Lake
City. Upon his return to Salt Lake City he had his attorney arrange visits with his child for two and one-half
hours one day each week and on November 7, 1956, visited
with said child. (R. 21) On November 7, 1956, defendant
was served with the complaint in this action which recited
January 30, 1955, as the marriage date. (R. 1) Defendant
was allowed the two and one-half hour '~sits on Fridays
to and including the 23rd day of X O\ember, 1956, just
before defendant filed his answer and counter-claim in
this action, after which plaintiff refused defendant visitation with the child. (R. 28) Thereafter plaintiff served defendant "·ith an Order to Show Cause on or about the 27th
Jay of November 1956 and it was heard December 3, 1956.
The Uonrt ordered payment of support money, temporary
:1limo11~· and attorney's fees and Yisitation with the child.
(R. 11 and 14) After defendant filed his notice of appeal
and on or about February 1, 1937, and thereafter plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tiff refused defendant visitation again and defendant
thereafter filed and served an Order to Show Cause and
upon hearing the Court found the plaintiff in contempt
and imposed a suspended jail sentence and admonished
her to allow defendant visitation rights as ordered in the
decree ( R. 182 and in District Court files after this record
came up to the Supreme Court).
The trial was held without jury on the 22nd day of
December 1956. On the 28th of December a Decree was
made and on January 2, 1957 the Decree was entered, allowing divorce to plaintiff, custody of child to plaintiff,
support money, alimony for one year, attorney's fees and
visitation rights with the child to defendant for three
hours per week (R. 165 et seq.)
During the trial the court and plaintiff's counsel frequently interrupted the examination by defendant's counsel on the pretext of saving time or that the questioning
was to "hurt or besmirch the child." (R. 43, 44, 45, 52,
53, 85, 87, 88, 93, 101, 141 and 142.)
Defendant filed a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and to Amend the Decree, and
also a Motion for aNew Trial. (R. 166 to 178 inc.) In Defendant's affidavit accompanying his Motion for a New
Trial on the ground that he did not receive a fair and
impartial trial he attests:
'' ... I verily believe that I did not receive a
fair and impartial trial in the above entitled matter on the 22nd day of December 1956 and in the
proceedings thereto and thereafter in that at my
11
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d
appearance at the courtroom of the above ent•tl
l e
court in compliance with the Order to Show Cause
filed herein to be heard on the 3rd day of December 1956 which was set for 10 :30 a.m., I and my
attorney' arrived at the said courtroom at 10:00
a.m. and sat thherein until about 10:25 a.m., at
which time Mr. Ned Warnock, plaintiff's attorney,
came out of the Judge's Chambers, "\vhereupon I
inquired of my attorney if the case was discussed
by one attorney and the judge and he answered
that it shouldn't be; and that it is apparent from
the actions and statements of Judge Stewart Hansen made at the said Order to Show Cause hearing and at the trial that the matter was pre-tried
and pre-judged out of the presence of myself and
my attorney because the said Judge's statements
would not have been within his knowledge but for
discussions thereon between himself and the attorney for plaintiff and this contention is borne out
by rulings showing in the record excluding evidence my attorney attempted to produce and also
by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Decree filed in the above entitled matter on
the 2nd day of January 1957 when compared with
the evidence in the record as produced at the trial;
and that said Xed \Y arnock is a brother of the
stepfather or adopting father of said plaintiff and
he has been oYerzealous in his personal interest
in the rna tter as is shown bY his actions in the
courtroom and as is shown in the other accompanying affidaYits attached hereto: and that the
court refn::-wd counsel for mYself to admit evidencP surrounding the marriage a11d immediately
tlH'n'<lfter after the plaintif£'8 attorney opened up
the matter and particularly near the conclusion of
the trial ns will show in the reporter ·s record;
and that the court stated that it did not want or
need any summation argu1nent at the conclusion
of presenting of eYidenre and m~T attorney was

12
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refused an opportunity to make a summation argument; and that as soon as the defense attorney
stated that he had no further questions the Judge
immediately collected his papers and the plaintiff's attorney had his brief case closed and was at
the cloak rack for his overcoat when my attorney
inquired of the Judge about summation argument,
all of which indicated that it was prearranged and
that all during the trial the Judge and plaintiff's
counsel were continually urging speeding up of
the trial by my attorney, all of which indicated
that everything was predetermined anyway ; and
that the actions and statements of the said Ned
Warnock as shown in the accompanying affidavits
bears out my contention that the matter was pretried and pre-judged and that I did not receive a
fair and impartial trial.''
The affidavit of :Mr. Finn Z. Gurholt is as follows:

"I, Finn Gurholt, after first being sworn
upon oath depose and say, That on the 22nd day
of December 1956, I attended and heard the trial
and testified as a witness at the trial in the divorce
matter between Sheila Wherritt Graziano and
Charles Benito Graziano before Judge Stewart
Hansen at the Salt Lake County Court House in
Salt Lake City, Utah; that thereafter and in the
evening of the said 22nd day of December 1956, I
and my wife were invited and attended a party as
guests of Mr. and Mrs. Lester Blackner, at the
home of .Mr. and Mrs. Ben Lingenfelter, parents of
Mr. Blackner, at 526 East 13th Avenue in Salt
Lake City, Utah; that also as a guest at the said
party was Mr. Ned Warnock, who is the attorney
for the said Sheila Wherritt Graziano; that at
said party at the start thereof, Mr. Warnock,
aforesaid, and myself and my wife were congenial
and as the party progressed and Mr. Warnock
13
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became more intoxicated he became loquacious
and he directed his remarks to the group of guests
in general and stated in .words an~ substance,
'That son of a bitch Graziano, meaning Charles
Graziano that dirty bastard, we will fix him'';
that I th~n interjected, saying, 'Will you repeat
that Mr. Warnock'; that then Mr. Lester Blackner stepped in asking me not to engage in argument· that then said Mr. Ned Warnock then
' to me and my wife, 'You both get out of
shouted
here Mr. Gurholt. You had better leave right
now'; that I and my wife had on our coats and I
stated to Mr. Warnock in the hearing of the host,
~Ir. Blackner, 'Yes, in deference to our host or
otherwise you might get hurt badly"; that Mr.
Blackner tried to excuse the actions of ~Ir. Ned
Warnock and expressed his regrets thereof; that
I and my wife then left the party.'
The affidavit of J o Anne Fallentine is as follows:
"I, Joann Fallentine, after first being dnly
sworn upon oath, depose and say: That on the
28th day of December 1956, at the Balsam Inn at
Brighton, rtah, ~Ir. Tom Warnock, son of ~Ir.
Ned \V arnock, "~ho is the attorney for the plaintiff in an action between Sheila Wherritt Graziano
and Charles Benito Graziano for divorce, engaged
me in conversation in the presence of :Jirs. Boyd
Summerha~·s: that said Tom \Yarnock stated that
'rrhe Judge called my dad and thanked him for
being so patic·nt with the defense·; that said Tom
vVarnock also rdated that ·~Ir. Graziano was not
going to rect•in" visitation rights, was to pay alimoll~·, support money and lawyer ·s fees'; that said
Tom \Varnock also stated •.Jir. Christensen, attonw~T for l\lr. Graziano, didn't maintain an office
and he had !10t been in practice of late'; that said
~r r. Tom \\ arnock made many other derogatory
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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statements about Mr. Graziano and his attorney,
Mr. Christensen.''
The only denials of the statements in the affidavits
were not under oath and were made by Judge Hansen
and Mr. Ned Warnock at the hearing of the defendant's
:Motion for a New Trial, and these denials were directed
to the charges that the matter was discussed in chambers
and that it was pre-determined. (R. 152 to 157 inc.) Defense counsel called the attention of the court at the hearing to the Rules of Procedure that counter-affidavits filed
within ten days are the proper procedure in matters of
this type. (R. 158) The Rules of Civil Procedure of Utah
covering the matter is Rule 59 (c) and opposing affidavits
are therein provided for. The Court questioned that he
needed to make affidavit and proceeded to have his statements read into the record not under oath. (R. 152 to 157
inc.) The court allowed Mr. Warnock to read into the
record his statements not under oath. Mr. Warnock stated
he wouldn't file any affidavits. (R. 158) Defense counsel
called the court's attention to the fact that the rules were
made for just such cases as this. (R. 152) After the hearing on the Motions to Amend and Motion for a New Trial
the court on January 22nd, 1957, denied all of the Motions.
Thereafter and on January 23rd, 1957, an Amended Decree was filed which contained the same provisions as the
former Decree. Thereafter defendant proceeded with his
appeal to the Supreme Court.

15
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED, FOR THE REASONS:
(A) THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS THAT
PLAINTIFF SHOWED GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE BUT ON THE CONTRARY THE
EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE, AND

(B) THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW
THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
WILL BE SERVED BY PLACEMENT OTHER
THAN WITH PLAINTIFF.
2. APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASONS:

(A) THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE ARE NOT
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE EVIDENCE, AND
(B) THAT APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE A
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
3. THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE RELATING TO:

(A) WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S MOTHER MADE
STATEMENTS TO PLAINTIFF DEGRADING
DEFENDANT IN HIS OCCUPATION, AND
(B) APPELLANT'S EXPLANATION OF HIS ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S QUESTION AS TO HIS REASON FOR HIS MARRIAGE
AS AN HONORABLE AND PROPER ACT
UNDER HIS CHRISTIAN AND MORAL CODE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED, FOR THE REASONS:
(A) THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS THAT
PLAINTIFF SHOWED GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE BUT ON THE CONTRARY THE
EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE, AND
(B) THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW
THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
WILL BE SERVED BY PLACEMENT OTHER
THAN WITH PLAINTIFF.

The attempt of the plaintiff to show grounds for divorce may be separated into the following:
(a) That defendant quit his jobs,
(b) That the house defendant furnished for his family in Connecticut was inadequate and had no privacy,
(c) That defendant's relatives and neighbors in Connecticut were not sociable,
(d) That defendant's mother was illiterate, and
likewise as to his other relatives, and
(e) That in Connecticut plaintiff had no social and
recreational activity and was unhappy.

17
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It is to be noted that defendant's jobs in Salt Lake

City were not a matter of terminating because of voluntary quitting or being discharged. In the case of the employment as a chef at Finn's restaurant the termination
was due to Mr. Gurholt 's returning to his post after recovering from an injury. (R. 96 and 97) In the case of
the employment at Alta Club it was a temporary employment at its inception. Further it is noted in connection
With this employment that plaintiff particularly stressed
to defendant that she and her mother's family were embarrassed by friends of theirs mentioning meeting and
seeing defendant at this position. So no doubt the plaintiff could be charged with desiring the termination of
this employment. (R 97) In the case of employment at
~\lakoff's Tea Room the termination was a matter of discontinued operation and the entire staff was laid off.
(H. 97)
There is no contention on the plaintiff's part that defendant failed in any respect to provide for plaintiff or
their child. It is to be noted that during all of defendant's
employments at Salt Lake City plaintiff continually told
defendant that her mother kept telling her that defendant's occupation as a chef was degrading. (R. 79, 80, 105
and 106). It is to be noted that the defendant was very
highly thought of by his employer and that he performed
('X<'ellenily at his trade (H. 97). Finally under cross-examination plaintiff finally stated that she did not complnin about anywhere except in Connecticut. (R. 84) So
dnring the trial when her contention about the changing

18
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of jobs lost their merit she abandoned it and pointed
thoughts only in Connecticut.
The evidence shows throughout that defendant kept
himself fully employed and provided for his wife and
child. When one of his employments ceased he immediately obtained other employment. The continual interference and derogation concerning defendant's occupation by plaintiff's mother's statements to plaintiff and
relayed to defendant caused defendant to move from Salt
Lake City to Aspen, Colorado, where he had pre-arranged
employment at the Jerome Hotel as a chef. (R. 36 and
37) Defendant kept fully employed in Connecticut and
as plaintiff admitted in her testimony defendant's employment with the International Harvester Company
offered good opportunities. (R. 41) It is to be noted that
it was this employment in which defendant was engaged
when plaintiff took the child and abandoned the defendant and came to her mother's home in Salt Lake City,
Utah. (R. 61) It was from this employment that defendant was forced to leave to come to Salt Lake City in
October 1956 to protect his family rights and his obligations to his child. Defendant immediately after arriving
in Salt Lake City obtained employment as a salesman.
(R. 21 and 25) It is submitted that plaintiff's attempt
to show lack of industry or irresponsibility on defendant's part by job changes is without merit and much can
be assigned to plaintiff's and plaintiff's mother's attitude
toward defendant and his occupation. It is interesting
to note that plaintiff did little if anything to encourage or
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help as a wife who is trying to make a success of a marriage does.
Plaintiff testifies that the house in which plaintiff,
defendant and their child took residence upon arrival in
Connecticut, which belongs to defendant's mother, was
inadequate and she could have no privacy and it was all
centered in the kitchen. (R. 39) Under cross-examination
of plaintiff and testimony of defendant it is shown that
the house is a fine nine-room, very modern first floor
compartment of a two-story house with two kitchens,
three bedrooms, living room, dining room, bathroom and
sun room in the first floor compartment. The first floor
compartment was very adequate for the residence of
(lefendant 's mother and the defendant and his family and
the plaintiff had ample provision for privacy. (R. 55 and
108) Plaintiff under cross-examination finally admitted
"there is nothing wrong with the house." (R. 55, line 29)
It is submitted that plaintiff shows that her effort to sustain a ground of divorce on such a contention as the inadequacy of the> house is entirely frivolous.
\ Vhen plaintiff's point as to the house did not hold
up she reverted to defendant's relatives and neighbors
in Connecticut; and particularly stated that defendant's
mother "·a~ illiterate. (R. 39) After much cross-examination plaintiff admitted that her accusation that defendant's mother was illiterate was wrong and that her complaint wns that plaintiff meant ignorant but upon further
examination it was shown that plaintiff's only complaint
was that defendant's mother could not speak English or
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only broken English but that after a short while she
could understand the mother. Plaintiff admitted that after
being there for a while and talking with defendant's
mother she had no trouble understanding her. (R. 56, 57)
Plaintiff also admitted that defendant's brother and his
wife who lived in the second-story apartment of the house
were not illiterate and were all right, as well as the neighbors. (R. 58) It is to be noted that defendant's mother
worked days and at the same time defendant worked and
that plaintiff had her time and place for the most part to
herself during the daytime and there were two kitchens.
Certainly the defendant's mother did not bother or interfere with the activity of the plaintiff about the home and
nowhere does the plaintiff so contend. It is submitted that
plaintiff retracted all of her contentions relative to the
personal attacks on defendant's family members. This is
corroborated in the note left by plaintiff when she abandone dthe defendant, to wit: 'Don't blame anybody but
you and me.' (Exh. 3) These frivolous and irrevelant
contentions of plaintiff are tacit admissions of the fact
that she was in dire want of some evidence to sustain
her alleged ground for divorce.
Soon after arriving in Connecticut plaintiff asked
defendant to get an apartment elsewhere than in his
mother's house but upon knowing of the likelihood of
defendant being drafted into the army she agreed to await
the results from the draft board. (R. 39 and 40) Plaintiff
attempted to show that defendant provided no social or
recreational life for plaintiff during the marriage. However, further examination shows that defendant took her
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to plays, theatres, socials, swimming, tennis and other activities very often during the time in Connecticut. (R.
113) Plaintiff stated that she was only complaining about
the social activity and recreational activity in Connecticut. (R 84) It is interesting to note that plaintiff received
more of such activities while in Connecticut than when in
Aspen, Colorado, or Salt Lake City, but she insists on
narrowing it to Connecticut. It is to be noted that plaintiff urged the acquisition of another apartment and complained of lack of activity and at the same time plaintiff
was secretly each week during the months of May and
June depositing parts of defendant's earning in her private bank account to supplement the $200.00 her father
sent to her to leave defendant in April.
Plaintiff stated that she lost twenty pounds during
her entire period of marriage to defendant. (R. 42) It is
not contended that plaintiff "-as made ill from weight loss
and that it did not effect her health for she admits much
physical activity in tennis, swimming and other activities
in Connecticut and also in Salt Lake City after she abandoned defendant. (R. 83 to 89 inc. and 113, 136 and 137)
Plaintiff would haYe it implied that her weight loss and
sadness was due to defendant, where as a matter of fact
the evidence shows it was due to her being constantly
harassed by her mother, sister and stepfather urging her
and conspiring with her to leave defendant. (R. 61, 63, 64,
79, 80, 105, 106, 133 and 134) Defendant ·s undenied testimony is that plaintiff was usually sad whenever she received phone or letter messages from her family members.
(H. 1:~:J and 133) It is not strange that her conscience
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bothered her when she knew, as she expressed in her letter, that defendant was 'good and did not deserve it' and
she was at the same time secretly preparing to abandon
and hurt the defendant that she was under a strained sadness of her own making, coupled with conspiracy with
her father, mother and sister. It is submitted that plaintiff may have made a better and more conscientious effort
to fulfill her marital contract and obligations to her husband and child but for the constant urging and interference from her mother, sister and stepfather to leave
defendant and cause a separation. It is also submitted
that this contention of no social and recreational life is
without merit under the evidence.
It is to be noted that plaintiff not only produced no
evidence to sustain a ground of divorce while on the witness stand but that she tacitly admits that she had no
ground for divorce in the following ways: (1) Plaintiff
asked defendant to give her a divorce soon after arriving
in Connecticut (R. 40, 41 and 91), (2) plaintiff threatened
that if defendant left Connecticut and came to Salt Lake
City he could not see their child (R. 51, Exh. 2), (3) plaintiff tried by quasi bribe to keep defendant in Connecticut
by writing that if he stayed there and did not resist her
divorce action she would not ask for suport money and
alimony (Exh. 2), ( 4) plaintiff used courting favor and
pressure methods alternately in refusing defendant visitation rights with their child-favors before defendant
moved in the procedures of this action, spite and pressure
after he made procedural moves-(R. 28), (5) plaintiff
used pressure methods on defendant on the child's birthSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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day to force defendant to sign a waiver of service and
answer ( R. 49 and 123), and ( 6) plaintiff testified she
wanted a 'nice easy divorce' (R. 49, lines 17 and 18).
In desperation of failure to make a showing of some
evidence of ground for divorce plaintiff's counsel using
a leading question, "Did defendant tell you he no longer
loved you~'' to which plaintiff answered 'Yes.' (R. 41)
The defendant emphatically denied this in his testimony.
(R 138) Defendant's attempt at reconciliation after com~
ing to Salt Lake City in October 1956 certainly shows
that the plaintiff's affirmative answer is unreliable. (R.
35 and 121) It is the old story in divorce cases that if
you haven't any ground just testify that your spouse said
he no longer loves you.
Both the judge and plaintiff's counsel became ob-sessed with the thought that defendant was "trying to
besmirch or hurt the child.'' It is submitted that plaintiff's counsel started this and impressed it upon the
judge because that is the Yery- phraseology and main
contention that plaintiff's attorneys used in taking the
defendant's deposition in this matter and it is the same
phraseology the judge used in making remarks from the
bench at the beginning of the hearing on plaintiff's Order
to Show Cause on December 3, 1956, after being in chambers with plaintiff's counsel for about one-half hour
lwl'orc the hearing as is stated in defendant's affidavit
<H'eompanyiJJg' his :\Lotion for a X ew Trial, and the same
Htatements of the judge from the bench at the comm('IW<'m<•nt of the trial, as well as the repeated use there24
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of during the trial. (R. 154, 174, 175 and 186) It is to be
noted that the judge made the remarks at the beginning
of the hearing on the Order to Show Cause before he had
any access to the deposition and that adds weight to the
contention that the judge and plaintiff's counsel discussed it in chambers before the hearing.
Let us examine this and see what occurred. To begin,
the plaintiff insisted on alleging in her complaint an
untruth as to the date of marriage. Defendant admonished her about it when she. had it in the complaint she
gave him accompanied with the waiver. Plaintiff and
her counsel became incensed when defendant stated the
correct date of marriage in his answer and counterclaim and made the obsessed idea of defendant 'hurting
the child' in the defendant's deposition. Plaintiff in her
testimony stated that the child was conceived out of
wedlock and to defendant's counsel's question, "Who
said the child was conceived out of wedlock~" plaintiff
answered "I did." (R. 44) Also plaintiff was advised by
defendant's counsel that many children are born within
seven months of conception as was this child but plaintiff insisted on her answer. And at this point the court
and plaintiff's counsel came vehemently forth with the
hue and cry" Trying to hurt the child." An examination
of defendant's deposition will show that defendant and
defendant's counsel made a vigorous argument against
any implication that the child was conceived out of wedlock and argued strenuously to the contrary. (R. 186)
Plaintiff admits she eradicated the date on the marriage
certificate. (R. 43) Now it is submitted that no persons
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of plaintiff's and defendant's names were married in
Elko, Nevada, on January 30, 1955, and the record would
so show. Therefore, if a divorce had been granted under
plaintiff's complaint it would have been of no force or
effect. It is further submitted that if plaintiff had alleged
the true date of marriage, defendant in his answer would
have admitted it and the issue of date of marriage and
implication of conception out of wedlock would never
have entered the picture. Certainly any blame for the
implication or the hurt or besmirch - real or fancied is at the instance of the plaintiff. Especially so after
defendant had called it to plaintiff's attention when she
handed him a complaint and waiver on October 20, 1956
(R. 48) It is submitted that plaintiff and plaintiff's
mother showed some false sense of shame in this matter
in urging plaintiff and defendant to go to Connecticut
soon after the marriage, eradication of date on marriage
certificate, announcement of a false date of marriage,
and insistance on alleging an untruth as to the marriage
date in the complaint.
The judge's statement on two occasions of interruption to rush the matter and saYe time was that all he was
interested in was that she was unhappy in Connecticut.
(R. 59, lines 22 to 30 inc. and 60, line 1) Of course, many
people are unhappy under certain circumstances and for
periods of time. I submit that is no reason or ground for
divorce - especially where the husband was doing his
level best to make things pleasanter and especially where
plaintiff had already decided she did not want the marriage and wanted a divorce. Most wives with any degree
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of desire for making a marriage a success or any sense
of mutual responsibility with their spouse will try to help
and encourage in the rough times of the venture. It is
submitted that plaintiff did not take her marriage seriously and was discouraged from the start from so doing
by her parents. It is not a question of whether the plaintiff was unhappy of itself, it is a question of whether
defendant caused the unhappiness, if it really existed, or
whether he was responsibile for any real or fancied unhappiness. It is submitted that defendant, laboring
against heavy odds from the plaintiff and her family did
his level best to properly provide and care for his wife
and child and did so, and that the plaintiff's unhappiness,
if any really existed, was entirely of her and her family's
making.
Did plaintiff and plaintiff's family really believe
that defendant's sense of family responsibility and love
of wife and child was so shallow that mere money- not
ask for alimony and support - threat of no child visitation and spiteful and resentful treatment of visitation
with child would dissuade defendant from facing up to
the situation and meeting the issues in a forthrightly
manner? How mistaken they were !
Even after the appeal was filed they refused visitation and forced defendant to cite plaintiff for contempt
and she was given a suspended sentence in order for defendant to gain his right of visitation.
Therefore, it is submitted that plaintiff certainly
proved no ground for divorce against defendant and she
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should have been denied the divorce and that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law thereon are not in
conformity with the evidence.
Now let us examine the evidence to determine
whether the defendant showed ground for divorce under
his counterclaim. The evidence shows the following
facts : the plaintiff joined her mother and sister in continually telling defendant his occupation was degrading,
the plaintiff joined her mother in directing the type and
placement of plaintiff's and defendant's home furnishings to the embarrassment of the defendant, the plaintiff aided and abetted the harassment of defendant by
indulging in reading pronographic books and literature
until in one instance defendant found it necessary to
take the book back to plaintiff's mother who furnished
it to plaintiff, the plaintiff and plaintiff's mother resisted
defendant in taking plaintiff and their baby from the
hospital to plaintiff's mother's home and defendant found
it necessary after some time to insist that his wife and
child come to their home, the plaintiff insisted in relating
her unchaste and illicit sexual affairs with her men
acquaintances during several years before their marriage,
and also mal\:ing comparisons. The plaintiff does not
deny any of her self-described illicit sexual affairs with
named men. In plaintiff's cross-examination she definitely admits the persons, places and times as a foundation for defendant's testimony as to her sex relations
with these persons. Plaintiff in no instance denies any
of the defendant's testimony of her self-related affairs of
unchastity and immoral background. Plaintiff in her own
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testimony states that she does not believe in God or Christ
and does not intend that her and defendant's child be
given religious guidance and rearing. Defendant testifies
that he is a lifelong member of the Catholic religious
faith and a devout Christian. Defendant's concern and
love for his child is shown throughout the entire case in
the following instances :
(a) Plaintiff testifies it is her belief defendant did
not care if she left, but he did not want the child to go
and this expressed in her letter to defendant (Exhibit 2),
(b) plaintiff used child visitation to court favor of and
pressure on defendant because plaintiff knew defendant's
keen concern and love for their child and (c) defendant's
continuous insistence on visitation rights with their child
in spite of all of plaintiff's resistant efforts to dissuade
defendant. The plaintiff and her stepfather conspired to
cause plaintiff to leave and abandon defendant by providing funds secretly, by encouraging plaintiff to leave
defendant and separate from him, and by poisoning the
plaintiff's mind with degrading statements about defendant and his occupation. The defendant was industrious,
always fully employed, of good and conscientious reputation (R. 97), loves children and children love him (R.
97), had and has a deep sense of family responsibility and
was and is particularly concerned about his own and
plaintiff's rhild 's welfare.
The plaintiff makes no contention that defendant did
not properly provide for his wife and child. In fact, he
did so and in the plaintiff's Order to Show Cause hearing
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defendant states he was and is desirous of supporting
their child (R. 19).
It is submitted that defendant has faced the issues
fairly and straightforwardly and he is justifiably concerned about the environment under which their child is
to be raised. It is his conviction - as is shown by reflecting on the whole of the evidence and proceedings
herein- that his child be not influenced by the environment of pornographic attitudes, lack of Christian belief
and understanding and unchaste habits, the very same
environment under which the plaintiff was raised and
which may result in the child developing as the plaintiff
has. It is likely to be asked why then did defendant try
to reconcile with plaintiff after returning to Salt Lake
City in October 1956. The defendant is convinced that the
environment of himself and plaintiff is vastly different
from that of plaintiff, plaintiff~s mother and stepfather,
and that the influence he would be able to exert on plaintiff away from her folk's influence and his influencB upon
their child when constantly and daily being with plaintiff
and the child would eliminate the undesirable traits of
plaintiff. These influences of defendant cannot be effected
by infrequent and short visitation periods under the present decree order. It is very apparent that under the present situation of no conciliation attitude of plaintiff which
exists that it becomes the defendant's duty to urge some
environment and custody in himself or his mother or some
desirable custody other than plaintiff and her mother's
family. Defendant has requested the custody and has
shown that he is ready, willing and able to assume the
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responsibility (R. 137 and 138) Defendant has agreed
to provide a home and care in Salt Lake City or elsewhere with visitation rights to plaintiff.
The evidence also shows that plaintiff abandoned the
support of the defendant and that in Aspen, Colorado,
plaintiff failed to give proper attention to their child by
leaving her alone for periods of time. (R. 117)
The history of plaintiff's behavior is that of a girl
who had access to means for a college education and
foreign travel as well as quite some financial worth, and
that of a moral misbehavior with boy friends at college
and in European countries. The foundation for the relation by the plaintiff of moral misbehavior is laid in
plaintiff's testimony on cross-examination and the relating of the specific instances in detail is produced in defendant's testimony, all of which is undenied by plaintiff
and in fact bolstered by lain tiff's counsel's question that
plaintiff related these facts to defendant before marriage. ( R. 67 to 71 inc. and 113 to 117 inc.) Also the
undenied testimony of defendant as to the type of pornographic books owned by plaintiff's mother and read by
plaintiff and defendant's taking a book from plaintiff
and returning it to plaintiff's mother. This pattern of
misbehavior of plaintiff ran true to form right into defendant's acquaintance and plaintiff very well summed
it up in her written statement, "I was, still am, and
always will be very sorry for making a tragedy in your
life. You are very good and don't deserve it, but there
was no other way to end the mess we got ourselves into.
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... I know now that you are thinking only of Gina. · .. "
(Exh. 2) The foregoing is an extract from a letter from
plaintiff to defendant dated July 26, 1956, after she had
taken their child and run away from defendant. The
reputation and forthrightness of the defendant is testified
to by his employer in Salt Lake City when he was and
after he was first married. Thte defendant's actions in
doing the honorable and right thing toward the plaintiff,
his keeping fully employed and providing for his family
in the face of resistence from plaintiff's mother and
family, his deep concern for his child and his continued
efforts for the child's best interests attest to his goodness
and corroborated his wife's statement, "You are very
good and don't deserve it"-meaning the way plaintiff
and her family had treated defendant. The evidence
shows that the defendant is a God-fearing Christian
and has had fine Christian upbringing. The plaintiff herself testifies that she does not believe in God or Christ
and Christianity. The plaintiff herself testifies that she
does not intend to nor will she give their child any orthodox Christian upbringing or guidance.
The evidence shows that immediately following plain.
tiff's and defendant's marriage plaintiff and her mother
desired that plaintiff and defendant go from Salt Lake
City to Connecticut, that plaintiff related to defendant repeated statements assigned to plaintiff's mother that the
occupaion of defendant as a chef and such were degrading; that plaintiff's mother officiously prevailed upon
plaintiff to will all of her propPrty and possessions to
plaintiff's mother; that plaintiff's mother officiously diSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rected the type and placement of plaintiff's and defendant's home furnishings; that plaintiff's mother moved
plaintiff and said child from the hospital to plaintiff's
mother's home and stayed there so long that defendant
found it necessary to demand that plaintiff and their
child come home; that plaintiff's mother and stepfather
held out inducements to plaintiff to come home at their
expense after plaintiff and defendant moved to Aspen;
and that plaintiff's mother and stepfather secretly and
about a month after plaintiff and defendant arrived in
Connecticut sent funds for plaintiff to leave and abandon defendant. The plaintiff's sister and mother pleaded
and coerced plaintiff into running away from defendant
and take their child with her.
Early in her Connecticut residence plaintiff wanted a
divorce. Early in that period her stepfather sent $200.00
to her to leave defendant. Just before going to Connecticut plaintiff was visiting from Aspen, Colorado, at her
mother's home in Salt Lake City and quite likely there
was planted the idae ofseparation and plaintiff quite
likely went to Connecticut so she could leave defendant
and return to Salt Lake City where defendant would
be far away and less likely to come so far to contest a
diorce action in the event he refused to give her a requested divorce. When defendant refused to give her a
divorce she had the groundwork laid for her abandonment. That she made a strenuous effort to get defendant and keep him at a distant place is evidenced by the
contents of her letter using refusal of visiting child as
a t,hreat and to not ask for support and alimony as
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inducement for defendant to stay away and not contest
her contemplated divorce action. Plaintiff's attitude toward the solemnity of her marriage is shown in her statement that she wanted a "nice easy divorce."
Defendant has continuously and repeatedly shown
that his primary concern is to his family and particularly
to their child. Defendant has continuously and justifiably
shown his concern about the lack of moral upbringing
and activities of the plaintiff and the lack of God-fearing
Christian belief of plaintiff as it will affect their child's
lifei if the child is raised under the influence that the
plaintiff was raised under. The very results of the plaintiff's life is a living example of the likely results of
their child's life under those environmental circumstances.
Regardless of what may be the final decision in this
matter relative to the child's future rearing in particular,
and whether or not defendant's grounds for divorce is
determined to be well taken and that plaintiff failed to
sustain any ground for divorce, the defendant will be able
to face the future knowing full well that, in spite of all the
numerous acts of resistance by plaintiff and her family,
he has in all his actions including these court actions done
all he could to effect what is for best interests of their
child and maintain his responsibilities thereunder as he
sees it and he can go forward with a clear conscience
knowing that no future events as to the child's life can
be because he did not meet the problems and duties
forthrightly.
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In Wilson v. vVilson, 124 Cal. App. 655; 13 P. 2d 376,
the court held: Award of custody of two minor children to
husband granted divorce for wife's adultery, with provisions permitting wife to visit children at reasonable
times, was for the best interests of the children and fair
to spouses.
In Larsen v. Larsen, 134 Kans. 436; 7 P. 2d. 120, the
Court held: Where husband obtained divorce for wife's
misconduct, custody of minor children were properly
granted to husband's mother rather than to wife.
In Barnett v. Barnett, 158 Okla. 270; 13 P. 2d 104, the
court held: In wife's action for divorce wherein husband
filed cross petition, awarding custody of children to father
who obtained divorce was proper under the evidence.
The case of Holmanv. Holma,n, 94 Utah 300; 77 P. 2d.
329, is applicable in many respects to the case at bar and
the reasoning therein is interesting to this case. In the
Holman case there was no question of immoral background or lack of Christian beliefs and rearing as in this
case. Hqwever, the court pointed out that provision for
custody of the child for a portion of the year to the father
should be provided.
Therefore, it is submitted that plaintiff failed to prove
any ground for divorce; that defendant proved more than
sufficient grounds for divorce under his counterclaim
and that defendant should have been and should be
awarded a divorce; that the best interests of the child
will be served by awarding the custody of the child to the
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defendant as he proposes in his testimony or at least to
remove the child from the environmental influence of the
plaintiff and plaintiff's family as it now exists.
POINT 2
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASONS:
(A) THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE ARE NOT
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE EVIDENCE, AND
(B) THAT APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE A
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL.

The argument set forth under Point 1 above fully
covers the (A) part of Point 2 and is made a part hereof
by reference.
As to part (B) of Point 2, the affidavits of the defendant, Mr. Finn Gurholt and ~Iiss Joann Fallentine are
set out in the Statement of Facts herein (Supra, pp. 11-15)
and support the contention of the defendant that the
judge and counsel for plaintiff discussed the case before
the plaintiff's Order to Show Cause hearing and that the
judge manifested by his statements, actions and attitudes
during the trial that he had pre-judged and pre-determined the matter. (R. 153) Let us analyze what occurred.
Defendant and his counsel arriYed at the court room at
10:00 a.m. the day of the Order to Show Cause hearing
and sat therein until about 10 :~5 a. m., at which time
the plaintiff's counsel eame out of the judge's chambers.
Defendant made the inquiry of his counsel ,vhether the
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case was discussed by counsel for the plaintiff with the
judge. Court convened at 10 :30 a.m. and the judge made
comments from the bench relative to "besmirching the
child" and other remarks about the case that he could not
have known but for a discussion with plaintiff's counsel.
Both the judge and plaintiff's counsel became obsessed
with the thought that defendant was ''trying to besmirch
or hurt the child.'' It is submitted that plaintiff's counsel
started this and impressed it upon the judge because that
is the very phraseology and main contention that plaintiff's attorneys used in taking the defendant's deposition
in this matter and it is the same phraseology the judge
used in making remarks from the bench at the beginning
of the hearing on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause on December 3, 1956, after being in chambers with plaintiff's
counsel for about one-half hour before the hearing as is
stated in defendant's affidavit accompanying his J\.tiotion
For a New Trial, and the same statement of the judge
from the bench at the commencement of the trial, as well
as the repeated use thereof during the trial. (R. 154, 174,
175 and 186) It is to be noted that the judge made the
remarks at the beginning of the hearing on the Order to
Show Cause before he had any access to the deposition
and that adds weight to the contention that the judge
and plaintiff's counsel discussed it in chambers before
the hearing. Plaintiff's counsel must have impressed the
judge with the thought "hurt or besmirch the child" at a
discussion, otherwise it is hard to conceive why the judge
was always so alert and overzealous to concern himself
time after time throughout the trial, in many instances
without plaintiff's counsel's intervention, and be joined
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by the plaintiff's counsel in the hue and cry. Especially
so when every act in the case that might cause a refleetion on the child was initiated by the plaintiff. It is interesting to note that at no time and no place did the
defendant in this matter bring the child into the picture
with relation to the feature of conception out of wedlock. A perusal of the defendant's deposition will reveal
that defendant and his counsel strenuously objected to
any implication that the child was conceived out of wedlock. (R. 186) Time after time defendant's counsel informed the court that the testimony trying to be adduced
had nothing to do with the child. (R. 44, 142 and 155)
During the trial the court and plaintiff's counsel
continuoually tried to rush the matter by statements of
saving time as follows :
Lines 24 and 25, page 45 of the Record: ''Let's
see what he has got in mind, JJ r. Warnock, and
save time." (Italics writer's) Record, p. 52, line
30: "Mr. Warnock: I am just trying to save time
here." Record, p. 53, Lines 1, 2, 3 and 4: "Mr.
Christensen: We have plenty of time. This case is
contested, and I don't think that I am going to
prejudice the interests of my client by rushing for
the benefit of opposing counsel, your Honor."
Record, p. 85, lines 28, 29 and 30, and p. 86,
lines 1 to 8 inc. :
''The Court : We can go on all day with this,
Mr. Christensen.
"Mr. Warnock: We ca11 go on all week.
''Mr. Christensen:
question f
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You refuse to allow that
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''The Court : No. I can't just see any point
in it.
"Mr. Warnock: I object.
''The Court : The only place she has complained about is Bristol.
''Mr. Christensen: I want to show she could
have friends, like she had tried in these other
places.
''The Court: Go ahead to save time, if you
think it is important.''
(This is a good example of the court wanting to try
the defendant's case as counsel for defendant. The attitudes of let's get it over, I've got it determined anyway,
prevails all along.)
Record, p. 87, line 30 and p. 88, lines 1 and 2 :
"The Court: All I am doing, I am trying to
cut this thing down. It is fine to do these things
and take all the time you want, but let's keep the
thing relevant. That is all I am asking.
"Mr. Christensen: That was her direct examination, complaining about it, and I am just
following through.
''The Court : Go ahead.''
Record, p. 93, lines 17 to 30, inc. (It was about
noon with about two hours of trial having been
used.)
''The Court : I am going to ask you how much
longer you are going to be first.
"Mr. Christensen: I think I am through with
this now, and I will reserve the right to ask questions when we return.
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''The Court : How long are you going to take
with the defendant~
"Mr. Christensen: About as long as with her.
"The Court: Let's come back at one o'clock
and see if we can't finish .... I am not trying to
tell you how to try your case. I am just trying to
cut

down a little time.''
Record, p. 101, lines 23 and 24:

''The Court: Let him go ahead, Mr. Warnock.
I think we will save time.'' (All italics are
writer's)
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence
the court and plaintiff's counsel had their papers and
effects together and were in the act of leaving when defendant's counsel inquired as to summation argument, to
which the court answered that it didn't want or need
any. (R. 148) The whole trend of the trial was a "rush
act'' on the part of the judge and plaintiff's counsel,
particularly after the direct testimony of plaintiff. An
atmosphere of nothing else matters why prolong it prevailed. As a matter of fact, the trial consumed less than
four hours. The defendant's contention that the court
was prejudiced is emphasized further by the court in its
statements, to-wit:
''The Court: She said she was unhappy there.
That is tlll~ only thing I care about.'' (R. 59, line
30 and 60, line 1)
The court's attitude was one of allowing anything that
showed plaintiff was unhappy and nothing to show the
cause of unhappiness if any existed and whether or not it
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was merely a concoction in the plaintiff's mind and
whether or not defendant had anything to do with her
being unhappy. That defendant had nothing to do with
any real or fancied unhappiness of plaintiff or whether he
was doing his best to make a success of the marriage and
to make his family happy seemed to be of no concern in
the thoughts and attitude of the court and it manifested
an attitude of disregard and indifference toward the
defendant's side of the case. It is little wonder that the
court's attitude during the trial, coupled with the other
occurrences set out in the affidavits accompanying the
Motion for a New Trial caused these lay persons to feel
that the defendant was not receiving a fair and impartial
trial.
Near the conclusion of testimony the court ''jumped''
at a conclusion and argued with defendant as follows:
Record, p. 141, lines 24 to 30 inc. and p. 142.
By _Mr. Christensen:

'' Q. Mr. Graziano, you heard your wife testify. On or about the 1st of March 1955 where
were you?
"Mr. Warnock: Well, if the Court please, I
object to this as being improper redirect.
''The Court: It is.
"~Ir.

Christensen: He (meaning plaintiff's
counsel) came up with this in this last and
said, your Honor, that he married her knowing all this. X ow I am going to show the situation
there. He (meaning plaintiff's counsel) opened
that up.
41
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''The Court: The situation for what : Why he
married her~
''Mr. Christensen: Yes.
''The Court : Oh no, we are not going into
'
. .
that. They got married and they go this child, and
I am not going to let anything in this world - I
don't care who it is, and if it is going to the Suphere Court it will have to -but there is not going
to be anything in this record that is going to
reflect on this child. I don't care a darn about
these parties." (Italics writer's)
(It is interesting to note here that the court, when
plaintiff was on the stand, did not stop any reflection on
child due to her statements and her untruthful pleadings.)
''Mr. Christensen: I didn't say about this
child.
''The Court : That is what you are not going
to get into.
''Mr. Christensen: I am going to show the defendant did the honorable thing and married her.
"The Court: That is what I am talking about,
you are not going to do.
'' l\Ir. Christensen: He would explain he would
have married her despite her telling some of these
cases before the marriage.
''The Court : He already volunteered that
statement himself.
''Mr. Christensen: What Y
''The Court=. Ex_actly what you just said. He
has volunteered 1t lnmself. He has already said
that.
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"The Witness: (Mr. Graziano) When did I
say

that~

"The Court: You just got through saying it
a minute go. It is in the record.
''The Witness: Would you read it for me,
please~

"The Court: You are not going to read it.
It is already said. Leave this child alone.
"Mr. Christensen: I am not talking about the
child. I am talking about the plaintiff and the defenedant. May I proceed~
''The Court : As long as you lay off that stuff
it is all right. Go ahead.
"Mr. Christensen: He (meaning plaintiff's
counsel) opened that up.
"The Court: He has already said, Mr. Christensen, that he wouldn't have married her if he
hadn't been on the spot, or words to that effect. He
has already said. I don't know what more you
want about this.
"Mr. Christensen: All I want to know, when
he returned - that he can testify when he returned from Reno on the job of taking moving pictures, she requested that he marry her, and he
suggested that she go down and talk to her mother.
She came back and then he agreed to marry her.
"The Court: Well, that is your proffer of
proof, and you can put it in the record.
"Mr. Christensen: Can't he testify to that
after they bring up this matter~
"The Ce>urt: No, sir. You have made your
proffer and it is in the record.
'' nir. Christensen: Miss Reporter, let the record show that counsel was refused an opportunity
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to explain the matter brought up by counsel .for
plaintiff relative to the occurrence at the time
the defendant made arrangements for the marriage with the plaintiff on or about the 1st of
March 1955 and counsel for defendant saves all
'
exceptions relative
thereto.''
It is submitted that the court surely indicated a
pre-judging and pre-determination thereon. And on the
subject of argument between the judge and defendant
witness the court would not allow the defendant through
his counsel to further question defendant to explain his
statement, "That he had no alternative" but to marry
plaintiff in answer to the question of Plaintiff's counsel.
The judge assumed only one interpretation and that is
his own, ''He said he was on the spot and that is all there
is to it." Defendant -wanted to explain that he did not
marry plain tiff because he was ''on the spot'' as the judge
said, but because under his, the defendant's, moral and
Christian rearing and sense of right and wrong it was
the honorable thing to do and the right action to take
under the circumstances, and that he had a love for and
care for the plaintiff at the time of and after his marriage.
Also defendant could testify that he refused plaintiff's
suggestion at the time to have an illegal operation. But
the court adamantly refused his pretext of "'hurt the
child'' thought that he was obsessed of during the entire
proceedings. In situations of this type one must face the
realities and if certain features exist they must surface
to have a just determination. One cannot always cover up
the unsayory incidents of lwha,·ior as plaintiff and her
family has been accustomed to doing and as the judge
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attempted to and did in this case. A fact is a fact and in
litigation they must surface to arrive at justice to all of
the· parties concerned. Defendant knew that he could not
have been forced at the time to marry plaintiff as the
court would indicate the answer meant. It is submitted
that the action and attitude of the judge on this point,
coupled with the other demonstrations of his attitudes
during the proceedings, definitely shows prejudice and
pre-determination as is stated in the defendant's affidavit.
The trial was on December 22, 1956, and at a party
on the evening of that date the affidavits-uncontested and
undenied-shows plaintiff's counsel stated, "That son of
a bitch Graziano, that dirty bastard, we'll fix him!" Now
who is the "we"? Let us connect that with the affidavit
of ~Iiss Joann Fallentine that at a lodge in Brighton,
Utah, on the evening of December 28, 1956, the date the
judge made his decision, the son of plaintiff's counsel
stated that the judge talked with his dad and congratulated him on handling the case, etc. Now fitting the remarks in the affidavits of Mr. Gurhol and Miss Fallentine
together it is a reasonable conclusion that the "WE" is
the judge [~nd the plaintiff's counsel. At any event, the
two affidavits came to defendant's attention and he and
Mr. Gurholt, both of whom were present during the entire
trial and heard and saw it all, felt that the judge had not
been fair and impartial and had pre-determined the
matter. Defendant brought the foregoing facts to his
counsel and requested that he do something about it. Of
course, counsel was aware of all but the contents of the
affidavits and as defendant counsel feels much the same
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about the men's conclusions, defendant's counsel, upon
the insistance of defendant, prepared the affidavits based
entirely upon affiant's statements and prepared the Motion for a New Trial and argued it at the hearing.
Defendant's counsel at the hearing of the Motion for
a New Trial, when the judge and plaintiff's counsel were
anxiously making statements, not under oath and being
made a part of the record, of denial of parts contained
in the affidavits, were advised by defendant's counsel that
the rules of procedure provide that the proper method is
to file opposing affidavits within ten days of service of
the Motion. The judge indicated that he didn't have
to or need to make affidavit or statement under oath.
(R. 158)
Defendant's counsel advised the court that the rules
were made to cover just such cases as this and he and
plaintiff's counsel were being charged with unfairness
and partiality. (R. 152, lines 10, 11, and 12) To defendant's counsel's reference to the Rule 59 (c) for filing opposing affidavits plaintiff's counsel said, "I won't :file
anything." (R. 158, line 9) Both the judge and plaintiff's counsel were disturbed mostly about the charge of
discussing the matter in chambers and pre-determination and their statements not under oath and for the
record were to denying these features of the charges only.
Of course, these features are somewhat circumstantial
but the foregoing facts and the actions of the judge and
plaintiff's counsel all through the proceedings prove defendant's contention thereon, it is submitted. There is
46
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no attempt by the judge or plaintiff's counsel to deny any
of the statements otherwise contained in any of the three
affidavits and that is understandable as they are a matter
of the record and any parts thereof not a part of the
record, if any, are not denied. Plaintiff's counsel falls
back on ltis legal and social graces or errors to cover his
actions mentioned in :Mr. Gurholt 's affidavit, and he manufactures a warped version of his son's statements to
cover that slip or occurrence, but he does not make any
attempt to deny the contents of Miss Fallen tine's
affidavit and he refused to file any opposing affidavits.
Rule of Civii Procedure of Utah 59 (c) reads :
"Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application for a new trial is made under subdivisions (1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by
affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after
such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20
days either by the court for good cause shown or
by the parties by written stipulation. The court
may permit reply affidavits.''
It is submitted that the court and plaintiff's counsel
were cognizant of the rule and it is submitted further
that being officers of the court, under charge, and in
charge of the hearing, the rule should be doubly applicable
to them.
A comparison of the evidence in its entirety and
the Findings of Fact filed in the matter clearly indicated
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and corroborates defendant's contention that the matter
was pre-determined. The Findings of Fact are clearly
one-sided and not in conformity with the facts adduced
in evidence. A reading of the Findings of Fact would
leave one to wonder whether plaintiff's action was even
contested. It is submitted that a comparison of the Findings of Fact proposed by defendant and accompanying
his Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact and the evidence are in conformity.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that defendant did not receive a fair and impartial trial and that the
evidence does not support the Findings of Fact filed in
the matter.
POINT 3
THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW
APPELLANT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE RELATING TO:
(A) WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S MOTHER MADE
STATEMENTS TO PLAINTIFF DEGRADING
DEFENDANT IN HIS OCCUPATION, AND
(B) APPELLANT'S EXPLANATION OF HIS ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S QUESTION AS TO HIS REASON FOR HIS MARRIAGE
AS AN HONORABLE AND PROPER ACT
UNDER HIS CHRISTIAN AND MORAL CODE.

As to the (A) part of Point 3, I refer to the Record,
p. 79, lines 24 to 29 inc., which is as follows :
''The Court: Did You tell the defendant that
your mother told you "that being a chef was degrading?
"The Witness (Mrs. Graziano): I could have.
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"Q (By Mr. Christensen): And did your
mother tell you that 1
"Mr. Warnock: I object to that.
''The Court : Objection sustained.''
It is submitted that plaintiff was the one who was
talking to her mother and plaintiff (the witness) knew
whether it was said to her or not by the person with whom
she was speaking. It is certainly not hearsay and it is
relevant in that the defendant pleaded in his counterclaim that plaintiff's mother interfered by telling plaintiff defendant's occupation was degrading. In fact, defendant in his counter-claim specifically pleaded the interference and in the reply plaintiff denied it. The evidence is proper to prove the allegation.
As to part (B) of Point 3, it is quite fully set out by
extracts from the Record under Point 2, at pages 41 to 44,
supra, and is made a part hereof by reference. It is submitted that when plaintiff's attorney opened up the subject on his cross-examination of defendant and obtained
an answer on the new subject it is proper re-direct examination to allow the defendant an opportunity to
explain the answer by question and answer from his counsel. It is submitted, however, that the court's main reason for not allowing the further examination was his
stated ''hurt the child'' contention and not the reason
assigned by plaintiff's counsel that it was improper redirect examination.
It is therefore submitted without further argument
that the court erred in not allowing the introducing the
evidence mentioned in Point 3.
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CONCLUSION
Counsel for Appellant respectfully submits that
plaintiff failed to prove any ground for divorce; that defendant proved sufficient grounds for divorce and that
defendant should have and should be awarded a divorce;
that the best interests of the child will be served by
awarding the custody to the defendant or at least toremove the child from the environmental influences of
plaintiff and plaintiff's family; and that the lower court
erred in denying defendant's Motion to Amend the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amend
the Decree.
It is further respectfully submitted that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not in conformity with the evidence; that defendant did not receive a
fair and impartial trial; and that the lower court erred
in denying defendant's Motion for a New Trial.
It is further respectfully submitted that the lower
court erred in denying the introduction of the evidence
as set out under Point 3 hereof.
Therefore, Counsel for Appellant respectfully submits that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree should be reversed and the matter found as set
out in defendant's Motion for Amendments or a new trial
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Wl\L J. CHRISTENSEN
.Attorn-ey for Appellant
1213 Windsor Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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